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COURTING THE RIGHT
Review of:
The Charter Revolution & The Court Party
By TED MORTON AND RAINER KNoPFF
(Peterborough, Ont.: Broadview Press, 2000)1 227 pages.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Charter Revolution presents an updated synthesis of the
argument that Ted Morton and Rainer Knopff advanced throughout the
1990s,2 namely that the rise of judicial power in public policymaking
following the enactment of the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms3 has put too much power in the hands of interest groups,
especially those on the left, and thereby threatens the democratic fabric
of Canada. These interest groups (gay and lesbian rights organizations,
feminist groups, poverty activists and civil libertarians, among others)
use Charter litigation to further their policy agendas, and because of this,
are said to constitute the "Court Party." This "Party," according to
Morton and Knopff, has succeeded in advancing its policy agenda,
because several key actors in the judicial process sympathize with its
goals and support its efforts. These actors include most notably, the law
clerks of the Supreme Court of Canada, federal bureaucrats in charge of
funding activist litigation, and law professors. Together, this alleged
cabal has hijacked the Supreme Court and transformed it into a venue
for advancing unpopular left causes to the exclusion of public
participation and public scrutiny.4
I [hereinafter The Charter Revolution].
2 Among their previous publications on this theme, see F.L. Morton & R. Knopff, "Does the
Charter Hinder Canadians from Becoming a Sovereign People?" in F. Fletcher, ed., Ideas into
Action: Essays in Honour of Peter Russell (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999); F.L. Morton
& 'R. Knopff, Charter Politics (Scarborough, Ont.: Nelson Canada, 1992) [hereinafter Charter
Politics]; F.L. Morton & R. Knopff, "Canada's Court Party" in A. Peacock, ed., Rethinking the
Constitution (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1996).
3 Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c.
11 [hereinafter Charter].
4 This characterization of Morton and Knopff's thesis is borrowed from P. Jackson, "Supreme
Court's Been Hijacked: Interest Groups and Slick Lawyers Sway the Cause of Justice" Calgary Sun
(4 May 2000) 15.
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As this brief description suggests, The Charter Revolution is part
partisan screed, part scholarly research on interest group pluralism and
part meditation on the relationship between the political and judicial
branches of government in a liberal democracy. These ingredients could
add up to A recipe for provocative and original scholarship. The authors
do indeed present a highly readable and sincerely argued analysis.
However, as I discuss below, the partisan screed surfaces time and time
again to undermine the authors' timely and challenging account of
judicial policy making under the Charter. Following the organization of
the book, I consider the main thrust of the authors' argument relating to
the Court Party, the "jurocracy," the state connection and the legal
intelligentsia. I conclude by examining the position of this book in the
literature on judicial power under the Charter in Canada.
II. THE COURT PARTY
In The Charter Revolution, Morton and Knopff take aim at a
loose but coherent coalition of interest groups which they characterize as
the '"Court Party"--comprised of groups that "seek to constitutionalize
policy preferences that could not easily be achieved through the
legislative process."5 Prominent members of the Court Party are said to
include the Canadian Civil Liberties Association (ccLA), the Women's
Legal Education and Action Fund (LEAF), the Charter Committee on
Poverty Issues, Coalition of Provincial Organizations of the
Handicapped (coPoH), and Equality for Gays and Lesbians Everywhere
(EGALE), among others. 6 Rather than employ constitutional arguments
as a means of protecting their own "liberty," these groups explicitly use
litigation as a vehicle for policy change. In this sense, Morton and
Knopff argue that the Supreme Court should be seen as a distinct venue
for political contest in which, as they put it, legislation may be amended
by appellate judicial interpretation of the Charter. Moreover, just as
legislators have partisan political parties which vie for control over the
policy agenda, so courts have spawned a broadly analogous type of
partisan party which seeks control over Charter decisionmaking.
Morton and Knopff acknowledge that the membership of the
Court Party will not always line up on the same side of Charter issues.
Libertarian civil rights groups and egalitarian feminist groups, they note,
typically oppose one another as intervenors in cases relating to obscenity
5 The Charter Revolution, supra note 1 at 25.
6 1bid.
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and freedom of speech even though they may share the larger project of
furthering policy change through Charter litigation.7 They also recognize
that not every Charter claim renders the litigant a member of the Court
Party. Criminal defendants, for example, routinely raise Charter
arguments, which sometimes may result in policy change, but their
objective typically is narrow and related to avoiding a criminal
conviction. Further, they acknowledge that the Court Party is not the
preserve of one ideological persuasion, noting the earlier "court parties
of the right" which successfully resisted welfare state policies in the U.S.
and Canada in the early decades of the twentieth century.8 Curiously,
however, the authors omit any significant reference to corporate
sponsored litigation in the post-Charter era, which similarly seeks to
further policy change through the courts. This is an especially striking
omission as the corporate community, at first glance, appears to be the
most powerful special interest in Canada, and certainly one which has
enjoyed marked success under the Charter.9 Morton and Knopff explain
this omission on the following grounds:
Similarly, corporate litigants cannot be counted as part of today's Court Party. As Hein's
review of Supreme Court and Federal Court cases shows, although corporations and
Court Party interests generated roughly the same number of legal challenges to cabinet
decisions and public policies between 1988 and 1998-about 100 cases each-there are
many more corporations than Court Party associations. Hein finds that one in eight
interest groups launched court cases, while only one in 399 corporations did so, showing
that corporations have a much lower propensity to litigate than do Court Party interests.
In addition, most corporate litigation is directed at other corporations with whom they
are competing. When they do challenge government statutes, it is in a defensive, reactive
mode. To date there appear to be no corporate eramples of the kind of sustained, systematic
Charter litigation undertaken by Court Party interests.I 0
The line that the authors attempt to draw between self-interested
corporations defending themselves on the one hand, and opportunistic
Court Party interests launching litigation proactively on the other hand,
is not compelling. Some of the earliest Charter cases featured
corporations successfully removing statutory barriers to conducting
business, 1 and successfully resisting regulatory enforcement by the
71bid. at 72-74.
8 1biL at 30.
9 For analyses of corporate Charter litigation, see, for example, A. Petter, "The Politics of the
Charter" (1986) 8 Supreme Court L.R. 473 at 490-93; and C. Tollefson, "Corporate Constitutional
Rights and the Supreme Court of Canada" (1993) 19 Queen's L.J. 309.
10 The Charter Revolution, supra note 1 at 85 [emphasis added].
11 See, for example, R. v. Big M Drug Mart, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295 (striking down the Lord's Day
Act prohibition on Sunday shopping).
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state.1 2 In these early cases, a central issue before the Court was whether
corporations could or should benefit from the protections set out under
the Charter. This in and of itself constituted an important policy agenda
which corporate Charter litigation proactively sought to advance. More
recent cases have seen corporations successfully strike down restrictions
on the freedom to advertise.1 3 Can such litigation be characterized as
"defensive"? Further, interest groups such as the National Citizens
Coalition (NCC) (funded by, among others, some of Canada's largest
insurance companies) have launched litigation expressly intended to turn
the courts into a venue for the pursuit of the neo-liberal political agenda.
The most well-known case involving the NCC was Lavigne v.
Ontario Public Service Employees Union.1 4 This litigation involved a
college teacher challenging certain expenditures by the union to which
he belonged. The teacher's litigation was financed by the NCC. Hundreds
of thousands of dollars was spent litigating whether the union had the
right to spend approximately two dollars of the teacher's salary on
political causes. This was not a defensive piece of litigation and there
was no issue of liberty for the plaintiff Lavigne, or for the Ncc; rather,
both shared a desire to prevent trade unions from spending dues on
political activities. Morton and Knopff mention Lavigne (and the NC's
financing of the case) only in passing as part of an analysis of the
influence of the Canadian Civil Liberties Association, which had
intervened in the case.15
Most recently, the NCC (currently headed by former Reform
party MP Stephen Harper) has challenged the Canadian Elections Act
because it limits to $150,000 the amount an interest group can spend on
an election campaign, which the NCC claims is an unconstitutional
infringement of the right to freedom of expression.16
If there is a Court Party, groups like the NCC constitute its
influential right flank. Excluding such groups from their analysis suggests
that the authors are not so much concerned with special interests as they
are with specific interests. The authors seem most offended by what they
characterize as the elitist, equality-seeking, social engineering
12 Hunterv. Southam Inc., [1984]2 S.C.R. 145 (striking down a search and seizure provision of
a statute regulating competition).
13 RR-MacDonald v. Canada (A.G.), [1995] 3 S.C.R. 199 (striking down a prohibition on
advertising tobacco products).
14 Lavigne v. OPSEU, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 211.
15 The Charter Revolution, supra note 1 at 73-74.
16 See M. Campbell, "Court Challenge Launched Over Election Spending Limits"The Globe
and Mail (8 June 2000) A4.
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philosophy of a handful of gay and lesbian advocacy groups, feminist
groups, and an ill-defined clatch of other groups representing the
vulnerable classified under the alternating rubrics of "postmodernism"
or "postmaterialism." Why should the involvement of these groups in
Charter litigation pose any more of a threat to democracy than the
involvement of corporate groups, or of large corporations themselves, in
Charter litigation to pursue neoliberal policy agendas?
A less unbalanced analysis might indeed conclude that the
opposite position is more tenable. Much of the litigation mounted by the
gay and lesbian and feminist groups has merely accelerated legislative
change removing openly discriminatory barriers. M. v. H.17 is a good
example of this phenomenon. While this Supreme Court decision led to
an omnibus bill changing over sixty statutes in Ontario to recognize same
sex partners on an equal footing to common law heterosexual spouses,1S
it is likely that these legislative changes were on the horizon in any event.
British Columbia and Quebec had already developed versions of the
same legislation, and several municipalities in Ontario, including
Toronto, were moving in this direction. Indeed, Ralph Klein, the
Conservative Premier of Alberta, decided not to invoke the
notwithstanding clause following the Supreme Court's decision in Vriend
v. Alberta,19 and added, "it's morally wrong to discriminate on the basis
of sexual orientation."20 Irrespective of how genuine this sentiment
might have been, or whether Mike Harris shared it, this view certainly is
consistent with the view of the majority of Canadians, who appear to
have not only approved of the decision in Vriend by a significant
majority, but also approve of the protection of civil rights of gays and
lesbians more generally. 21 By contrast, entrenching a constitutional right
to advertise and a constitutional right for special interests to contribute
unlimited amounts to political parties, are policy changes unlikely ever
to have emerged on any legislative agenda in Canada.
The idea of a Court Party (or, perhaps more accurately, court
parties) in Canada is intriguing, especially when such a party organizes
around policy agendas that are indeed legislatively unpopular. The
17 [1999] 2 S.C.R. 3 [hereinafter M. v. H.].
18Amendments Because of the Supreme Court of Canada Decision in M. v. H. Act, S.O. 1999, c.
6.
19 [1998] 1 S.C.R. 493 [hereinafter Viend].
20 Public statement to the media reproduced in J. Fletcher & P. Howe, "Public Opinion and
the Courts" Choices 6:38 (May 2000).
21 Ibid. at 38-42. See also K. Makin, "Top Court Inspires Highest Confidence" The Globe and
Mail (31 May 2000) A7.
20001
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
authors' critique of the self-serving "knowledge class" that occupies the
leadership of many interest groups active in Charter litigation is often
effective. Overall, however, the analysis of the Court Party in The
Charter Revolution is a partial and partisan account of how Charter
litigation is politics by other means.
III. THE JUROCRACY
The jurocracy is not precisely defined in the book but includes
the law clerks of the Supreme Court of Canada, administrative tribunal
members (especially in the human rights field), government legal
departments, the Law Commission of Canada, judicial institutes, and
education centres. For the most part, the links drawn between these
organizations and Court Party interest groups are well documented. The
one exception is the authors' attempt to show a link between the Court
Party and the law clerks.
Three law clerks are assigned to each Justice of the Supreme
Court. These clerks are for the most part recent law graduates drawn
from Canadian law schools. In an impressionistic account of the clerks'
role in the Court published several years ago, I attempted to link the role
of clerks in the Supreme Court with the emergence of that institution as
a de facto policymaking body in the wake of the Charter.22 In that article,
I concluded that clerks have a significant role in the form of Supreme
Court judgments but very little influence over the substance of those
decisions. While Morton and Knopff rely to some extent on this article,
they reach the far more dramatic conclusion that, "[i]n sum, the
influence of the clerks has been an important factor in the Court Party's
success before the Supreme Court."23 The only real basis for this claim is
that a feminist litigator once claimed to have inside knowledge of the
Court's decisionmaking (which the authors surmise must have come
from a clerk) and a reference to an "anonymous" source who claimed
that a clerk wrote the Oakes decision, which established the test to guide
judicial discretion under section 1 of the Charter.24 It is not clear what
point is served by these anecdotal assertions. With respect to Oakes, for
example, there is no suggestion that the clerk rather than the chief
justice decided the case, nor that the chief justice was unduly or
22 L. Sossin, "The Sounds of Silence: Law Clerks, Policy-Making and the Supreme Court of
Canada" (1996) 30 U.B.C. L. Rev. 279.
23 The Charter Revolution, supra note 1 at 113.
24 See, for example, ibid. at 111.
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improperly influenced by his law clerk. As I noted in my article, the fact
that clerks help draft judgments should be no more shocking than the
fact that speech writers draft addresses given by the Prime Minister. The
authors' conclusion that the clerks are "an important factor" in the
Court Party's success is overstated and unsupported.
IV. THE STATE CONNECTION
In this chapter, Morton and Knopff support their thesis that the
Charter is both an effect and a cause of interest group formation. The
authors show how the groups which benefitted from nurturing by the
state in the 1960s and 1970s (for example, multicultural groups, feminist
groups, and human rights organizations) tended to line up in favour of
the Charter from its inception, and subsequently have used the Charter to
shape public policy. Not all state connections to Charter litigation have
been indirect. The authors take special aim at the federal Court
Challenges Program, under which the government provides direct
funding for interest groups to challenge government action under the
Charter. While initially established to fund minority language-rights
litigation in the wake of the first Parti Qu~becois victory in Quebec, after
1985, the mandate of the Court Challenges Program was expanded to
encompass section 15 equality challenges under the Charter. This fund
was terminated in 1992 by the Conservatives and reinstated in 1995 by
the Liberals. It has provided crucial support for EGALE, COPOH, and LEAF,
among others. As Morton and Knopff rightly assert, such groups could
not function without the support of government granting agencies like
the Court Challenges Program. Much litigation against the government
is, it turns out, government sponsored in one way or another.
The involvement of government funding in interest group
litigation, however, casts doubt on the authors' overall thesis. If the
Court Party is indeed propped up through government funding, surely
this reflects a determination by governments that it is in the public
interest to have interest groups representing vulnerable groups which
otherwise would have no voice in Charter litigation. Indeed, the Liberal
Party was elected in 1993 having made a campaign promise to reinstate
the Court Challenges Program. Rather than the Court Party reflecting a
threat to democracy in Canada, the vitality of these advocacy groups
would seem to vindicate the effectiveness of democratic politics in
shaping and informing Charter litigation.
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V. THE LEGAL INTELLIGENTSIA
One of the least scrutinized sectors which influence Charter
politics in Canada is law schools. Law schools, and more specifically, law
professors, play an important role in shaping legal thought, developing
critiques of existing doctrines and thereby having an effect on the
direction jurisprudence takes. Morton and Knopff argue that law schools
provide three "tangible and crucial" modes of support for the Court
Party: administrative support, rights experts, and advocacy scholarship. 25
Morton and Knopff contend that legal scholarship (mostly law
professors publishing articles in law reviews) provides the intellectual
foundation of the Court Party. The authors cite the battered wife
syndrome, for example, as a legal development which migrated from law
reviews to judgments of the Supreme Court of Canada. The authors
claim that feminists, gay and lesbian advocates, and others explicitly
sought to influence the influencers, and that they succeeded because
"[t]he legal commentators are all singing from the same hymn-book."26
Here again, the authors undermine a valuable insight by
exaggerating its significance for partisan effect. A number of important
studies have been conducted on the incidence of judicial citation of
academic sources in Canada.27 Virtually none are cited by Morton and
Knopff. What these studies reveal is that very few pieces of what the
authors would describe as "advocacy scholarship" are ever cited by the
Supreme Court. The books most frequently cited by the Court are
doctrinal analyses of "Constitutional Law" or the "Construction of
Statutes".28 The most frequently cited articles do not come from the
Canadian Journal of Women and the Law or the Windsor Yearbook of
Access to Justice, as one might think having read Morton and Knopff's
analysis, but rather from the Criminal Law Quarterly, Canadian Bar
Review, Canadian Tax Journal, and Canadian Business Law Journal.2 9
Finally, while the quantity of academic citation in the Supreme Court
25 The CharterRevolution, supra note 1 at 143.
2 6Ibid. at 147.
2 7 See, for example, P. McCormick, "Do Judges Read Books Too? Academic Citations by the
Lamer Court, 1991-96" (1998) 9 Supreme Court L.R. 2d Series 463; G. Bale, "W.R. Lederman and
the Citation of Legal Periodicals by the Supreme Court of Canada" (1994) 19 Queen's L.J. 36; and
V. Black & N. Richter, "Did She Mention My Name? Citation of Academic Authority by the
Supreme Court of Canada 1985-1990" (1993) 16 Dal. L.J. 377.
28 McCormick, ibid. at 490.
2 91bid at 487.
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has increased since the advent of the Charter, this is not a Charter
specific trend. Indeed, academic citation is more common in private law
cases in the Supreme Court than in Charter cases. 30 By focusing so
narrowly on academic scholarship in support of what they have defined
as the Court Party, Morton and Knopff miss the larger and more
interesting question of how the Court uses legal scholarship in its
decisionmaking, when and why it resorts to doctrinal texts, social science
literature or advocacy scholarship. Focusing on advocacy scholarship
alone seems odd. Even in landmark Court Party cases, advocacy
scholarship tends to represent a minor, if not negligible, portion of the
academic material relied on by the Supreme Court.31
The authors claim that law professors also influence the Court
Party in more subtle ways. They contend that the rise of postmodernism
in legal education provides intellectual fodder for Court Party advocacy
groups. They observe:
Postmodernism rejects the possibility of scientific or objective knowledge, claiming that
all knowledge is self-interested and reflects (and supports) unequal power relationships
based on class, gender, race, and so forth. It portrays the political, legal, and cultural
traditions of western civilization as the corrupt legacies of "dead, white, heterosexual,
male" privilege. For example, deductive logic and concepts of evidence are often
dismissed as phallocentric modes of reasoning. Postmodernism provides the intellectual
grounding for many of the new postmaterialist social movements: feminism,
multiculturalism, gay and lesbian rights, and the more radical forms of
environmentalism. 32
While Morton and Knopff are right that postmodernism has enjoyed
some popularity in some law schools in Canada, this is a body of social
and legal theory that emphasizes the conservatism of the justice system
and its inherently oppressive tendencies. Postmodernists (to the extent
these scholars can be said to speak with one voice) typically reject public
interest litigation as a means to achieve a better world; while they often
believe that laws and government action are unjust, they also believe that
courts are unjust. It is, rather, old-fashioned civil rights liberalism that
provides the ideological and intellectual grist for the Charter mill.
Indeed, most public interest Charter litigation is modelled on American
civil rights litigation of the 1950s, the most famous example of which was
Brown v. Board of Education33 (which had, of course, influenced Canada
30 Ibid. at 478.
31 In M. v. H.,supra note 17 for example, thirty authors were cited, of which no more than two
or three could be characterized as "advocacy" related.
32 The Charter Revolution, supra note 1 at 131.
33 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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to adopt the Canadian Bill of Rights3 4 in 1960, and subsequently to
entrench the Charter in the constitution, in the first place).
VI. CONCLUSION: IDEOLOGY VS. SCHOLARSHIP IN
THE STRUGGLE TO DECODE THE CHARTER
The strongest critiques of the Charter and the rise of judicial
power in its wake have come from the right and left of the ideological
spectrum. Indeed, The Charter Revolution bears a striking resemblance
to the left critique of the legalization of politics by Michael Mandel in
The Charter of Rights and the Legalization of Politics in Canada.3 5 Both
books contend that parliamentary politics is not perfect but is a
preferable venue for political debate in a democracy than is the
courtroom. While Morton and Knopff lament that the courtroom has
become the captive of left-wing interest groups, Mandel laments that the
courtroom has become the captive of right-wing, corporate power. While
critics on the right such as Morton and Knopff see the Charter as a tool
of social activism, critics on the left see the Charter as limiting the ability
of the state to regulate the market and as a bulwark designed to thwart
social and political activism.3 6
While the Right and the Left both believe that the Charter has
fundamentally undermined Canadian democracy, it is the mushier
middle which contends that the Charter has in fact enhanced Canadian
democracy. Peter Hogg and Allison Bushell popularized the thesis of a
healthy dialogue between the judiciary and the legislature,37 which
became the accepted wisdom of the Supreme Court in a matter of
months following its publication in this journal38 Predictably, Morton
and Knopff claim that this so-called dialogue is in fact a monologue, with
judges doing the talking and legislators powerless to do anything other
than listen (though they concede that the "notwithstanding clause"
3 4 S.C. 1960, c. 44, reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. III.
35 M. Mandel, The Charter of Rights and the Legalization of Politics in Canada, rev. ed.
(Toronto: Thomson Educational, 1994).
36 See, for just a sampling of this literature, M. Mandel, ibid.; A.C. Hutchinson, Waiting for
CORAF A Critique of Law and Rights (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1995); and J. Bakan,
Just Words: Constitutional Rights and Social Wrongs (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997).
3 7 P. Hogg & A. Bushell, "The Charter Dialogue Between Courts and Legislatures" (1997) 35
Osgoode Hall L.J. 75; see also P. Hogg & A.Thomton, "The Charter Dialogue Between Courts and
Legislatures" (1999) 20 Pol'y Options 19.
3 8 Vriend, supra note 19.
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prevents outcomes from being forced on governments in most Charter
litigation). Morton and Knopff's more modest claim that Charter
litigation limits and influences the options open to government in social
policy settings is sound. The true nature of the judicial-legislative
conversation, and its impact on Canada's democratic institutions,
depends on the eye of the beholder (or ear of the listener, in this case).
Irrespective of how one characterizes the place of judges in the
conversation about public policy in this country, it. is clear that
Canadians need to better understand how legal institutions work, who
makes decisions and on what basis those decisions are made. Like their
earlier study, Charter Politics,39 this book does an excellent job of
bringing the world of judicial politics alive. Morton and Knopff vividly
illustrate the ways in which the justices of the Supreme Court have
animated the Charter through judicial interpretation, often in ways not
entirely consistent with the intention of the drafters. For this reason
alone, it makes a worthy addition to any reading list of introductory
courses on the Canadian legal and constitutional systems. However, the
authors' conclusion that the justices of the Supreme Court have become
the captives of advocacy groups, whether through a network of law clerks
and law professors or otherwise, is simply not persuasive. The Court
Party, if it includes groups which seek to use the courtroom to further a
policy agenda, constitutes a big tent indeed, with gay and lesbian activists
alongside tobacco executives, and LEAF shoulder to shoulder with the
NeC. Far from threatening democracy, the authors' own analysis suggests
that the rise of interest groups in Charter litigation appears to be a direct
and intended result of policy initiatives emanating both from the
executive and legislative branches. That the authors' conclusions do not
reflect this fact seems to flow from their clear dislike for many of the
interest groups which they say constitute the Court Party. While this
dislike may make for impassioned prose, it often distracts the authors
from their task of investigating the influence of interests groups in the
courts under the Charter, and ultimately detracts from what might have
been a much more compelling piece of scholarship.
Lorne Sossin
Assistant Professor
Osgoode Hall Law School & Department of Political Science
York University
3 9 Supra note 2.
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